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INTRODUCTION
Health Technology Assessment (HTA) systems, such as those of the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE), the Scottish Medicines Consortium (SMC) and similar organisations internationally, play an important role in assessing the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of new health care technologies. Such information allows health care systems to make decisions about whether new technologies should be added to the bundle of services that are funded or if existing technologies should be removed from it.
Within any given health care budget, a decision to reimburse a new, cost-increasing technology will affect the existing allocation of resources between services. Specifically, such decisions will have opportunity costs -the health forgone from the next best health care service displaced as a result of the new technology, assuming perfect rationality.
HTA therefore involves a process of weighing up the value for money of new technologies against the value for money of existing services. In practice, in the UK and some other countries, this entails comparing the incremental cost-effectiveness ratios (ICERs) of new technologies, generally expressed as a cost per quality-adjusted life year (QALY) gained, against a cost-effectiveness threshold. The threshold acts as a benchmark to judge whether or not the technology is acceptable value for money.
NICE has a threshold range of £20,000-£30,000 per QALY for most technologies (NICE, 2013) , although it is clear that this was based on very limited evidence. Towse (2002) suggests that although technologies that cost more than £20,000-£30,000 are less likely to be accepted by NICE, they are by no means certain to be rejected. This is echoed by Devlin and Parkin (2004) who present evidence that the threshold may be considered as a probability rather than a number. Using a logistic regression model, the authors find that factors other than incremental cost per QALY, such as uncertainty (over the costeffectiveness of the technology) and the burden of disease, are significant in explaining the likelihood of rejection of a technology by NICE.
The threshold remains a matter of some controversy: the House of Commons Select
Committee on Health concluded in its [2007] [2008] inquiry that "the affordability of NICE guidance and the range, measured in cost-per-QALY, it uses to decide whether a treatment is cost-effective is of serious concern. The threshold it employs is not based on empirical research and is not directly related to the NHS budget, nor is it at the same level as that used by PCTs [Primary Care Trusts -the territorial organisations responsible for purchasing health care for their local populations in England] in providing treatments not assessed by NICE". The committee recommended that the NICE threshold be reviewed by an independent body (Health Select Committee, 2008, p. 94) .
The question of what the threshold should be is a matter of fundamental importance to HTA processes and decisions. If the threshold is set too high, it is likely that technologies will be implemented that are worse value for money than those they displace, so that HTA worsens rather than improves allocative efficiency. Equally, if the threshold is set too low, it is probable that technologies will be rejected which are both effective and good value for money. Yet how the threshold should be established and what evidence is most relevant in its selection remain matters of some dispute.
There are broadly two approaches to understanding the cost-effectiveness threshold. The first is to consider the threshold in terms of the value that society places on the health benefits of new technologies. This is known as the "social willingness to pay (WTP)" approach, as demonstrated in Donaldson (2011) and Mason et al (2008) , for example.
Such an approach implicitly assumes that the health care budget is flexible: (a random sample of) the general public expresses its WTP for care unconstrained by the size of that part of national income that is currently allocated to health care.
The second approach to understanding the threshold -known as the "shadow pricing" or "opportunity cost" approach -is to consider the opportunity costs of technologies purchased by the health service within its current budget and the cost-effectiveness of technologies currently used. Unless the health service budget has been set at a level that enables all technologies to be purchased that have a cost-effectiveness at least as good as the social willingness to pay, the opportunity cost will not equal the public's willingness to pay. In contrast to the social WTP approach, in which it is assumed that NICE should set the cost-effectiveness threshold according to the WTP, the opportunity cost approach assumes that NICE should search for the threshold implied by the size of the current health care budget. Our research follows this second approach.
The concept of NICE searching for the threshold was put forward by Culyer et al (2007) .
They argued that it is not "constitutionally proper" for NICE to set the threshold and that NICE's function should instead be to identify the optimal threshold that lies between the least cost-effective technology currently provided and the most cost-effective technology not yet available routinely in the NHS (Culyer et al, 2007, p. 56 ). This view is echoed by Appleby et al (2009) who warn against NICE "conjuring up a threshold" when the factors determining it are beyond NICE's control (Appleby, Devlin and Parkin, 2007, p. 358) . Culyer et al (2007) present a model in which they show that, assuming that the health service seeks to maximise health gain, the threshold is equal to the inverse of the marginal health gain of the last technology funded and that as NICE cannot determine the size of the health care budget, its function is as a searcher for the threshold and not a setter of it.
A variety of empirical approaches have been taken to estimating health care system opportunity costs. Claxton et al (2013) There have been attempts to identify these marginal services and thereby search for the optimal threshold, as explained by Culyer et al (2007) . Appleby et al (2009) asked whether it was possible to infer local cost-effectiveness thresholds by studying decisions about service investments and disinvestments based on information collected from six Primary Care Trusts in England, including interviews with their Directors of Public Health and questionnaires given to the Directors of Finance. The authors were able to identify a number of services but concluded that they could not identify the implied cost per QALY threshold for the following reasons:
 They were not convinced they had identified "truly marginal" services;most PCT decisions were service reconfigurations including demand management and waiting list initiatives  They could not identify all local decisions; many options for (dis)investment would have been rejected before they were made explicit in documentation.  There was a range of criteria used to make local decisions and relatively little concern for cost per QALY.  It was difficult to establish a causal link between a change in local NHS budgets and specific local (dis)investments.
The work by Appleby et al (2009) The aims of this paper were therefore to: (1) explore the use of those data to identify the cost-effectiveness of health care services "at the margin" in the Scottish NHS,
consider the extent to which the thresholds observed in Scottish NHS decision making are consistent with the threshold being used to make judgements about new health care technologies in the UK, and (3) consider the extent to which Scottish NHS decision makers are QALY maximisers-and if not, what the implications of that are for approaches to HTA.
THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
A principal aim of our research was to attempt to identify NHS services "at the margin", i.e. services where investment or disinvestment is planned to, or could, take place, and to consider the cost per QALY gained of those services. The conceptual basis for the approach is described in Appleby et al (2009) , which we summarise here briefly.
From a given, fixed NHS budget, allocative efficiency (for example, defined as the maximisation of QALYs from a given budget) would be achieved by allocating resources to services which have the lowest incremental cost-effectiveness ratios (i.e. are best value for money), and proceeding to adopt new services in ascending order of their ICERs until the point at which the overall budget is exhausted. At that point, the cost per QALY of the next most cost-effective service tells us what service would be added, at the margin, if the total budget were to expand. Similarly, the service with the highest cost per QALY which was funded from the existing budget tells us the least cost-effective service currently affordable, given the budget constraint.
These "marginal" services define the NHS cost-effectiveness threshold. Given that the budget is fixed, if an HTA agency recommends a new, cost increasing technology, it can be provided only by the NHS reallocating resources away from other, extant services. If QALY maximisation is the guiding principle in resource allocation decisions by NHS budget holders, this disinvestment will occur in the marginal, least cost-effective, service currently funded.
Suppose we could identify, for every possible health care service, evidence on its cost per QALY gained (CQG) and an estimate of its overall annual cost (including associated service costs) if it were provided to all appropriate patients. As shown in Figure 1 , this information could be presented as a "league table". where services are ranked in order of their decreasing cost-effectiveness: the most cost-effective are at the top (CQG = £CE1) and the least cost-effective at the bottom (CQG = £CEN). In allocating their budgets, buudget holders will select cost-effective services because we assume them to be QALY maximisers. In other words, they will choose services in rank order, starting at the top and working down until the available budget is exhausted. For simplicity, and without loss of generality, we assume that there are no efficiencies from combining some services with others in bundles or clusters of mutually exclusive services.
The point at which the NHS budget of £∑CX is exhausted reveals the shadow price of a QALY as lying between the CQG of the highest cost per QALY service funded (£CEX) and that of the lowest cost per QALY service not funded (£CEY). The threshold is shown in Figure 1 as a bold line. The services immediately above that (shown in dark shading)
and below it (shown in light shading) are those investment and disinvestment decisions (respectively) that may be observable at the margin during any given budget period.
Identifying these marginal services potentially allows us to locate the region within which the effective cost-effectiveness threshold explicit or implicit in health care system decision making sits. that NHS budget holders act in a manner consistent with that; and that they have access to sufficient evidence (for example, on the cost per QALY gained of services) to render that a realistic objective.
In practice, we know that a range of factors other than cost-effectiveness in QALY terms matter to health care policy makers (Shah et al 2012) and to health care budget holders ). Therefore our study also aims to test the extent to which budget holders' decisions may reasonably be characterised as QALY maximising -and if not, what the implications for threshold estimation might be.
METHODS
We proceeded with our attempt to quantify the revealed cost per QALY threshold in NHS Scotland using three steps:
 Data collection: identifying NHS board level (dis)investments from the 2012/13 Scottish Parliament budget scrutiny and follow-up interviews with NHS Board Finance Directors by the research team 1. List of relevant marginal services: identifying which of the marginal services found in step 1 might be threshold revealing and hence whether it would be appropriate to seek cost per QALY evidence relevant to Scotland for them in the empirical literature 2. Literature search: conducting a search for cost per QALY evidence for each marginal service identified in step 2.
Each of these stages is explained in more detail below.
Step 1: Data collection
The research used two data sources:
1. The 2012/13 budget scrutiny issued by the Health and Sport Committee of the Scottish Parliament (available online for all 14 territorial NHS Boards in Scotland) 2. Follow-up, structured interviews with representatives from 12 NHS boards (we approached all 14).
The data are presented in Section 4, below.
We used the 2012/13 budget scrutiny documents available from the Health and Sport understanding and obtain further details of the services identified in the budget scrutiny (where the information was not available on the NHS board's website), (2) identify additional marginal services which are not listed in the budget scrutiny, and (3) ascertain the drivers of (dis)investment decisions in NHS Scotland and the role of costeffectiveness evidence in the decision making process. The interviews were in most cases audio recorded to ensure full capture of the information, although in three cases the interviewee preferred not to be audio recorded.
Each interview was written up by noting the answers given to each of the interview questions in turn. The notes were returned to the interviewee for confirmation or amendment. A number of the respondents followed up the interview by providing to the researchers additional information on particular (dis)investments discussed during the interviews. The additional information included press releases, correspondence between staff and copies of documents describing prioritisation procedures used by NHS Boards.
Step 2: List of marginal services
On completion of the data collection stage, the researcher who had conducted the interviews, SKS, compiled a full list of all marginal services in NHS Scotland mentioned for 2012/13. The following process was then used to narrow down the full list to a shorter list for which the research team were in agreement that it was appropriate to search for cost-effectiveness evidence.
The full list of services was passed to a second member of the team, JS, who began the categorisation procedure. Services were categorised by direction of spend and the type of marginal spend. Depending on the latter category, JS then labelled each (dis)investment according to whether it was potentially threshold revealing or not.
Where the interviewee had made clear that a (dis)investment was a non-discretionary response (e.g. driven by obligatory maximum waiting times) to changes in the volume of demand for an existing service, that service was excluded from the list as it would not be threshold revealing. The services that were potentially threshold revealing were then grouped into two categories: those where cost per QALY evidence was likely to be available and those where the information about the service was too non-specific (e.g.
an "emergency care centre" covering a wide range of services and patient groups) for a cost per QALY evidence search to be practicable.
JS's grouping of the services was then sent to ND and AW, in order for them to review the process and highlight areas where they disagreed, which would then be discussed by all members of the research team to reach a consensus decision. ND and AW confirmed the categorisations in all cases. Researchers JS, ND and AW have all either worked in the NHS or been involved in examination of NHS spending decisions in the past and thus have experience to make judgements. The categorisation process is outlined in Table 1, below.
Table 1. The categorisation procedure
The researchers identified 74 service changes from the budget scrutiny and a further 27 from the interviews, giving a total of 101 services. Of these, 68 were not potentially threshold-revealing and another six were too vaguely described to enable a cost per QALY evidence search, leaving 27 services. Of the 27, we were able to find cost per QALY evidence for 15, using the literature search strategy described below.
Step 3: Literature search
Having identified the relevant marginal services, we undertook a literature search for cost per QALY evidence. This was based on a hierarchy of sources, as summarised in Table 2 . The options were examined sequentially -if evidence was found in option 1, the search for evidence ceased at that point; if none was found in option 1, we continued to option 2, and if evidence was found there the search ceased at that point; but if not we continued to option 3, and so on. The first type of evidence we looked for was any source that we would have expected decision makers in NHS Scotland to consult, had they attempted to do so. Therefore, we searched first for documents such as SMC guidance and any material referred to directly by interviewees or found official documentation.
If this type of evidence was not available but NICE had appraised the technology, the estimates in the appropriate NICE Technology Appraisals (TA) are reported in the Results section. The SMC and NHS Scotland often rely on NICE multiple technology assessment (MTA) evidence. We assumed that if no Scottish-based evidence was available, NHS Scotland decision-makers would consult these alternative good-quality sources of evidence. Given the similarities between the Scottish, English and Welsh health care systems in terms of funding, service provision and patient population, we would not expect this to affect our results.
For both SMC and NICE appraisals, where there are many cost per QALY estimates per TA, the base case estimates for each patient group produced by both the manufacturer and the relevant reviewing body (Evidence Review Group/Assessment Group) are reported. In some cases, this includes optimistic and pessimistic estimates in addition to the "best" estimate. However, in instances where detailed sensitivity analyses are performed (for example, altering the values of a number of clinical variables), these were excluded for brevity and the evident decision ICER is reported.
If there was no SMC or NICE guidance available, we looked for an HTA report issued by the National Institute for Health Research (NIHR), which commissions work to assess the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of treatments and tests for the NHS. The authors of each HTA report begin with a review of the existing cost per QALY evidence before creating their own estimates. As for the SMC and NICE TAs, we have excluded the results of sensitivity analyses reported in these sources in order to be concise. The cost per QALY estimates for each marginal service were converted into 2012 GBP using the GDP deflator at market prices issued by HM Treasury.
DATA
The primary data source for this research is the 2012/13 survey of spending decisions at NHS Boards carried out by the Health and Sport Committee of the Scottish Parliament as part of its scrutiny of national spending plans. The secondary data source is a series of telephone interviews with senior NHS finance managers from 12 of the territorial NHS Boards (Directors of Finance in all but one case). We contacted all 14 territorial NHS Boards in Scotland but one did not respond after two follow-ups and one was unable to offer an interview date within the study period. The 12 NHS Boards where we obtained interviews account for 89% of Scotland's population.
The budget scrutiny
In 2010 The purpose of each budget scrutiny question for the research reported here is outlined in Table 3 . that had costs per QALY of £25,000, £30,000 and £35,000 respectively; we would then conclude that the upper limit of their threshold was £25,000 (assuming all figures rounded to the nearest £'000 for practical purposes).
Similarly, question 5(b) (which asks for the services the NHS Boards would have invested in if the funds were available) identifies the services which are deemed just too expensive to be invested in. Therefore, 5(b) may also be used to find an "upper" estimate of the threshold. So if the three examples given by an NHS Board in answer to question 5(b) had costs per QALY of £24,000, £28,000 and £30,000 respectively, this would suggest an upper limit of the threshold of £24,000.
Questions 5(a), 6(a) and 8(a) all ask for examples of positive investment. Assuming again that NHS Boards buy the lowest cost QALYs first, then these questions also identify marginal services, this time those whose cost per QALY is just low enough to receive investment. Therefore, the highest of these costs per QALY of these services may be used to identify a "lower" estimate of the threshold.
The interviews
The interviews with Finance Directors were tailored to each individual NHS Board's budget scrutiny response but all followed the same basic structure and asked for the same information. The structure of the interviews is outlined in Table 4 . In each subsection relating to the drivers of a (dis)investment decision, questions were asked sequentially in order to minimise the risk of "leading" interviewees to particular answers.
The questions were open-ended to start with and, depending on the responses, became more narrowly focussed on the use of cost per QALY evidence in the decision, that is:
1. What were the factors that led to this decision? 2. Did the cost-effectiveness of this service influence your decision? 3. Did the cost-effectiveness of this service in terms of the cost per QALY influence your decision?
Interviewees were assured that their responses would remain anonymous and aggregated with the information of obtained in all other interviews. A copy of the interview script for an NHS Board is supplied in Appendix B. Table 5 gives details of the 15 services found to be at the margin in one or more NHS Boards in Scotland in 2012/13, for which we found cost per QALY evidence. Each of the 15 services in Table 5 and Figure 2 is discussed in more detail in Appendix A, including a description of the service, an explanation of the data sources and the search terms used to identify them and references for the studies from which the cost per QALY data were drawn. Table 6 in Appendix A describes every estimate used to populate An implication of the theory outlined in Section 2 is that those in charge of NHS Boards would be expected to prioritise services by ascending cost per QALY. If they did we would observe the disinvestments to be less cost-effective (have a higher cost per QALY) than the positive investments. But this is not evident from Figure 2 , although we only identified two examples of disinvestments.
RESULTS

Cost per QALY of marginal services
Drivers of the decision making process
Although it was possible to find cost per QALY evidence for many of the marginal services identified in the budget scrutiny and the interviews, it is important to note that such evidence was rarely the driver of (dis)investment decisions at the level of NHS Boards. The SMC makes recommendations based on cost per QALY evidence, among other factors, on whether new medicines should be reimbursed by the NHS in Scotland (SMC, 2012d). Other than that, according to our interviews, cost per QALY evidence was not used on any occasion to justify marginal spending or disinvestment decisions made at NHS Board level. The lack of consideration of cost per QALY evidence presumably contributes to the lack of an apparent threshold in Figure 2 .
An interviewee from one of the smaller Boards explained that they simply did not have the level of health economics expertise available that would allow them to perform costeffectiveness analysis as part of their decision-making process. An interviewee from a larger Board suggested that Boards did not sift the evidence in the way the conceptual framework in Section 2 of the paper assumes. Decisions were based instead on perceived imperatives and priorities set outside the NHS Board. When asked the extent to which the dis(investment) process involved assessing services against a set of formally defined criteria, a representative from another Board described it as "more organic than that". We interpret this to mean that the decision involved discussion of multiple factors, some of which were traded-off against each other, to produce a local consensus; this would contrast with a simple association like a high cost per QALY meaning automatic rejection (or disinvestment). The same interviewee explained that cost-effectiveness in terms of QALYs was not a key factor in decision making and gave a specific example of where criteria important to the local NHS had meant that a potentially less cost-effective option, in cost per QALY terms, had been chosen.
There were, however, examples of NHS Boards making expenditure prioritisation decisions based, in part, on cost-effectiveness measured in some metric other than QALYs. For example, one Board has a prioritisation procedure involving 21 weighted criteria, of which one is "cost-effectiveness". This implies that the objective of the Board is not to maximise QALYs but some combination of the 21 criteria. Representatives from a number of Boards that did not currently apply this sort of procedure explained that they were in the process of developing their own models of this kind.
It should also be noted that for some decisions the cost-effectiveness analysis takes place at a national level. This is important because there were examples of Boards investing in services because they were told to by the Scottish Government, for example the AAA screening programme. We did not seek evidence on whether Scottish
Government had considered cost-effectiveness before issuing guidance to NHS Boards on specific services; none of the interviewees mentioned having seen such evidence.
Another theme that became apparent during the interviews was that explicit disinvestment from services of the type envisaged in Section 2 of the paper, i.e. making a service unavailable to patient groups to whom it was previously available, takes place only rarely. Question 4(b) of the budget scrutiny, which asked for the three main areas in which savings would be made at each NHS Board was universally answered with examples of efficiency savings, which the interviewees unanimously described as lowering costs without any expected reduction in benefits. A number of interviewees explained that for political reasons, cutting front-line services was simply not an option.
One interviewee did, however, refer to a report called "Making Difficult Decisions in NHS Boards in Scotland", created by a short-life working group for NHS Scotland (Radford et al, 2010) . The document considers decision-making at a population level as well as at an individual patient level and aims to guide NHS Boards in making decisions that are "transparent, accountable and robust enough to withstand scrutiny" (Radford et al, 2010, p. 9) . The working group noted that there were large variations across Boards in the way decisions were being made and sought to develop and standardise the methods.
However, cost-effectiveness is mentioned only briefly in this report. In addition, no NHS Boards other than the one that originally mentioned it said that they used the report to help make any "difficult decisions".
Having discussed the extent to which cost-effectiveness evidence is used by NHS Boards, the interviewees were asked to name the other drivers of their marginal spending decisions. The following factors were specifically mentioned, where the number in brackets indicates the number of references to that driver in association with a particular spending decision that were found in the interview recordings:
 Excess demand (where demand for a service consistently outstrips the supply), e.g. for dialysis due to the ageing population (15)  Scottish Government initiatives (9)  Clinical effectiveness (6)  Patient convenience, e.g. providing services locally where patients previously travelled to other Board areas (5)  New drugs being approved by the SMC (4)  'Political pressure' (3)  Centrally-led waiting time targets, e.g. "treatment time guarantees" for certain procedures (2)  The Board's position relative to other Boards, e.g. providing a comparatively low volume of service or being the only Board which does not provide a service (2)  Patient safety (1).
Cost-effectiveness, in non-QALY terms, was mentioned four times throughout the interviews. In all cases, the interviewee was unable to describe the type of costeffectiveness evidence that was used, only that it did not involve QALYs.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Our principal aim was to identify the services that were at the margin in NHS Scotland in 2012/13-i.e. the services where investment or disinvestment was planned to take place. In addition, we obtained information on the other factors taken into account within NHS Boards in Scotland when making spending prioritisation decisions.
The combination of the published scrutiny by the Health and Sport Committee of NHS Boards' expenditure plans at the margin backed by interviews with Finance Directors at the Boards yielded valuable information. We are grateful for the willingness of those Finance Directors to discuss the services they considered to be marginal. As a result we found a considerable and varied list of health care services and technologies that are at the margin of NHS spending in one or more Board areas in Scotland.
We found relevant cost per QALY evidence in the published economic literature for some, though not all, of the marginal services identified. The evidence revealed ranges of cost per QALY estimates for each individual service, sometimes very wide ranges. The ranges are also very different from service to service. The consequence is that the location of the threshold is unclear. Even if NHS managers were primarily concerned with maximising QALYs from their budgets, they would find it difficult to determine which particular cost per QALY estimate they should use for their decision making. The relevant threshold is equally unclear from the perspective of the SMC, whose function is to make judgements about value for money in a way that is consistent with the marginal cost of a QALY in the NHS.
Furthermore, the ranges of costs per QALY of the services being invested in at the margin overlap greatly with the ranges of costs per QALY of the services being disinvested from (see Figure 2) . Indeed the cost per QALY of acupuncture, which one NHS Board disinvested from, seems likely to be below that of other services currently being invested in. This would imply allocative inefficiency if the aim of the NHS in Scotland is to maximise QALYs. This is the assumption that justifies the use of a reimbursement threshold expressed as cost per QALY by SMC (and in England and Wales by NICE): i.e. that NHS decision-makers should prioritise their spending decisions as if they are maximising QALYs.
We have, in the current study in Scotland, gone further than Appleby and colleagues were able to in early 2007 in England (as reported in Appleby et al, 2009 ). Due to the availability of the Health and Sport Committee budget scrutiny data, and to how we were consequently able to structure the follow-up interviews, the services we have identified as potentially threshold revealing are truly marginal. In addition, both of our data sources included information on service developments that were considered but not implemented. Question 5(b) of the budget scrutiny questionnaire asked Boards for "three examples of service developments that you would consider priorities, but have been unable to fund in 2012/13". In the interviews we asked for further information about these and any additional examples of priorities that were not funded (see Question 2 in Appendix B of this paper). Thus we obtained information on spending plans which were rejected whether or not they were explicitly mentioned in other documentation.
We were also able to establish a clear causal link between the disinvestments and incremental developments identified by Boards and the need to stay within the budget for the financial year about to commence. The budget scrutiny asked how savings were being found to enable the Board to stay within its stated budget for 2012/13 and what incremental investments were planned within that budget. Our interviews followed up in the same terms and asked for further examples in the same context (see Question 3 in Appendix B of this paper).
Although we were successful in identifying a significant number of marginal services and finding corresponding cost per QALY evidence, we were repeatedly told in our interviews that cost per QALY evidence was, in practice, not taken into account in NHS Board expenditure decisions. NHS Boards are required to pursue numerous central targetse.g. on waiting times, moving services from hospital to community settings, reducing inequalities in health-and respond to local and national political and public pressure.
NHS Boards are evidently not trying to maximise QALYs but to hit simultaneously a multidimensional set of objectives within their constrained budgets. The approach to expenditure prioritisation taken by SMC and NICE appears to be fundamentally different from the view taken by NHS Boards as reported to us by their Finance Directors.
The SMC, and in England and Wales NICE, conduct health technology assessments on the assumption that the objective of NHS organisations is to maximise health gain as measured by QALYs, with some adjustment of the £/QALY threshold to take account of social value judgements (Rawlins, Barnett and Stevens, 2010) . The evidence presented in this paper is not consistent with this assumption. The applicability of a cost per QALY threshold in HTA is questionable when it plays no part in expenditure prioritisation decisions made in practice in the NHS.
One possibility is that Health Boards are not attempting to maximise any single objective but may be aiming to satisfy minimum requirements across multiple objectives. Our interviewees mentioned waiting times initiatives on several occasions, suggesting that satisfying these may be one of the key objectives of decision makers. This fits well with Dimakou et al (2009) who showed that hospitals responded to waiting time targets introduced by the English NHS. Multi-criteria decision making was also noted in Shah et al (2012) , where the authors analysed Impact Assessments carried out by the (English) Department of Health and identified 18 benefits other than QALYs that were taken into account.
The idea that Boards do not face a standard maximisation problem is consistent with our observation that savings are generally sought from efficiency improvements in the provision of existing services, or by deferring some other planned expenditure. Our interviewees identified numerous areas for efficiency improvements that would not, in their view, reduce the quality of, or the health gains from, those services. This behaviour might be expected if the aim of decision makers is not to fall below a satisfactory level of performance across multiple objectives or targets. It implies that NHS Boards do not operate "at the margin", the way they are assumed to in standard economic models.
Given the apparent mismatch between an approach to HTA which gives the greatest weight to incremental cost per QALY gained when advising on NHS reimbursement and the considerations driving local NHS expenditure prioritisation decisions in practice, there are several possible policy implications. Either the SMC should adjust its methods to more closely align with the objectives of the NHS or the NHS itself should attempt to more often make decisions based on the incremental cost per QALY gained of the services it provides. A third option is that the two organisations "meet in the middle" by using cost per QALY evidence in the areas where it is most appropriate and useful.
However, while different parts of the NHS are prioritising expenditure according to different criteria, whatever they are, then the result will very probably be allocative inefficiency from anyone's perspective.
APPENDIX A: COST-PER-QALY RESULTS
This appendix describes in turn each of the 15 marginal services for which we could find cost per QALY evidence), including a description of the search strategy and the evidence source, as well as an explanation of the variation in the cost per QALY estimates for that service, where relevant. Table 6 then references and summarises the cost per QALY evidence.
Abdominal aortic aneurysm screening
Starting in June 2012, all men across Scotland aged 65 were invited to be screened for abdominal aortic aneurism (AAA). The programme aims to identify men who have an aortic diameter of greater than 3cm by way of ultrasound examination of the aorta. If the measurement is over 3cm, they are referred to their GP who prescribes the next step (Health Improvement Strategy Division, 2010).
As the Scottish Government explicitly named the cost-effectiveness evidence assessed by the UK National Screening Committee (UK NSC) as part of the process of approving the screening programme 5 , it is those cost per QALY estimates that are reported in Table   6 . Because each point in Figure 2 comes from a different study (that uses a different patient population from a different country), the estimates display a considerable degree of variation.
Acupuncture
Acupuncture involves the stimulation of points on the body using a variety of techniques and is most often used in the treatment of pain relief.
As none of the other sources provided cost per QALY evidence for acupuncture, a Google search was performed using the keywords [acupuncture], [cost] and [QALY] . A number of the hits were lists or assessments of all the available evidence on the cost per QALY of acupuncture for various conditions. These reviews included the same studies which also matched the studies found in the original Google search (Ratcliffe et al, 2006; Reinhold et al, 2008; Stamuli et al, 2012; Willich et al, 2006; Witt et al, 2006; Witt et al, 2008a; Witt et al, 2008b; Witt et al, 2009; Wonderling et al, 2004) .
Much of the variation in these cost per QALY estimates may be explained by the studies evaluating the cost-effectiveness of acupuncture for a number of different problems:
lower back pain, osteoarthritis pain, Irritable Bowel Syndrome, neck pain, headache and dysmenorrhea.
Alcohol brief interventions
An Alcohol brief intervention (ABI) is a small series of sessions each lasting from a few minutes to 1 hour, targeted at individuals who report drinking at hazardous levels. The interventions are designed to be conducted by health professionals who do not specialise in treating alcoholism. As data points come from different sources and are for different patient groups, there is some variation, although most estimates lie below or within the £20,000-£30,000 range.
The one estimate which shows bariatric surgery not to be cost-effective by conventional standards is found in Salem et al (2008) and is for a population of individuals with 30 ≤ BMI < 35, after two years. Further details may be found in Table 6 .
Continuous positive airway pressure
Continuous positive airway pressure (CPAP) is used to relieve the symptoms of sleep apnoea by delivering a stream of compressed air to the airway, keeping it open and allowing unobstructed breathing.
Although the representative of the NHS Board in question confirmed that CPAP would be used if the Board were to invest in a sleep disorder clinic, it should be noted that the use of such equipment is just one of the interventions that would be provided by this clinic.
CPAP for sleep apnoea falls outside the remit of SMC, so the cost-effectiveness estimates displayed Figure 2 are taken from NICE guidance (NICE, 2008a) . The Assessment Group discussed four unnamed "published economic evaluations" as well as the manufacturer's submission before calculating its own cost per QALY estimates for three levels of severity of obstructive sleep apnoea/hypopnoea syndrome (OSAHS).
Ezetimibe
In 2003 As part of the technology appraisal, the manufacturer submitted its estimates for the cost per QALY of ezetimibe. These included only ranges of estimates and no specific estimated costs per QALY. However, the Assessment Group's estimates were more precise and the NICE Appraisal Committee concluded that "the Assessment Group's model represented the most appropriate analysis on which to base its decision regarding the use of ezetimibe" (NICE, 2007, p.17) . For this reason, it is the Assessment Group's estimates, by patient group, which are reported in Table 6 and presented in Figure 2 .
Insulin pumps
Insulin pump therapy, also known as continuous subcutaneous insulin infusion (CSII), is used to manage diabetes by continually infusing insulin into the subcutaneous tissue of the patient.
In 2011, NHS Scotland announced a large investment in insulin pump therapy with the aim of achieving:
 25% of under-18s with type 1 diabetes on insulin pump therapy by March 2013  Total number of people using insulin pumps to triple by March 2015 (Feeley, 2012 ).
It appears that NHS Scotland relies on the NICE guidance for insulin pumps (updated in 2008) to inform its decisions 6 . The various estimates of the cost per QALY of insulin pumps, as submitted by the manufacturer and reviewed by NICE's Assessment Group, are displayed in Figure 2 (NICE, 2008b). These vary depending on whether the assumptions made are "optimistic" or "pessimistic".
Keep Well
The Keep Well programme of health checks was launched in Scotland in 2006 with the aim of reducing inequalities in health care. Specifically, it offers screening for cardiovascular disease and its main risk factors in individuals aged between 40 and 64.
The programme operates in all NHS Boards but to differing degrees; it was initially rolled out in poorer areas.
Keep Well is an intervention focused at a very specific group of the population, and we were unable to find a SMC/NICE appraisal or an HTA specifically relevant. A search of NHSEED also yielded no results. Therefore, a Google search was performed using the 
Orthoptic vision screening
NHS Scotland is in the process of creating a universal orthoptic vision screening service for children in their pre-school year. This aim is close to being achieved but in 2012/13 there was still one NHS Board which had yet to provide the service and which listed it as an investment for the coming year during the interview.
In 2008, a review of orthoptic vision screening for pre-school children was carried out by the NIHR HTA Programme (Carlton et al, 2008) . This review included an assessment of the existing literature as well as a model created by the HTA team. Of the previous studies identified by the authors of the HTA, only one reported results using QALYs and used a sufficiently intricate model to satisfy Carlton et al (Kønig and Barry, 2004) .
These, along with the base-case results from the HTA (Carlton et al, 2008) 
Positron emission tomography scanning
The purchasing of positron emission tomography (PET) scanners was mentioned by a number of Boards both in the budget scrutiny and in the telephone interviews. The scanners were planned to be used to detect various forms of cancer. 
Protease inhibitors (hepatitis C)
In late 2011, the SMC accepted two new hepatitis C protease inhibitors for use:
boceprevir and telaprevir. The interviewees from all Boards that named protease inhibitors on their budget scrutiny returns confirmed in the interviews that they were referring to these new drugs.
Given that the decision to invest in hepatitis C protease inhibitors was made centrally (relying on the SMC's assessment of the evidence), we report the cost per QALY evidence from the SMC appraisal (SMC, 2011a-d).
For both drugs, the manufacturers submitted cost-effectiveness estimates by patient group (naïve, experienced or "null responders") and by severity of liver disease. For this reason, there is some variation in the ICERs displayed in Figure 2 .
The disease severity was not measured in exactly the same way for each drug: for boceprevir, patients were given a liver fibrosis "score" (F0 least severe, F4 most severe);
for telaprevir, the severity was branded "mild", "moderate" or "severe". In all cases, the new drugs in combination with two other drugs (peginterferon alfa and ribavirin) were compared with the two other drugs alone.
Proton beam therapy
In NHS Scotland, there are seven Special Health Boards which support the 14 territorial Boards. One of the "specials" is NHS National Services Scotland (also known as National Services Division), which funds a number of specialised services. Every year, an amount is top-sliced from each territorial Board's population-based resource allocations to fund the specialised services.
Proton beam therapy (PBT) is a specialised service which is receiving investment in NHS Scotland. It is a type of radiotherapy that uses a high-energy beam of protons rather than high energy X-rays to deliver a dose of radiotherapy for patients with cancer.
PBT has not been appraised by NICE, nor has it been assessed by the NIHR. Studies by Konski et al (2007) and Lundkvist et al (2005) were found by searching NHSEED. A twopage Google search yielded no additional results. Konski et al assessed the costeffectiveness of PBT to treat prostate cancer (for two separate population groups), whereas Lungkvist et al looked at a number of different cancers (breast, prostate, head and neck, and medulloblastoma). Further details may be found in Table 6 . Figure 2 and in Table 6 , below (Han et al, 2011; Juusola et al, 2011; Long et al, 2010; Lucas and Armbruster, 2012; Paltiel et al, 2005; Prabhu et al, 2011) .
Rapid HIV testing for MSM
It is important to note that some of the cost per QALY estimates are based on populations which include groups other than MSM alone, for example all "high risk"
groups, as well as groups from various countries. In addition, a number of the studies attempted to estimate the cost-effectiveness of various hypothetical changes to HIV screening habits, for example comparing screening every 2.4 years for low-risk; every 9 months for moderate risk; and every 3 months for high-risk to every 20-years low risk and every year for high risk.
Rivaroxaban
Rivaroxaban was accepted for use by the SMC in 2008 for the prevention of venous thromboembolism (VTE) in adult patients undergoing elective hip or knee replacement surgery. In 2012, the drug was accepted for two new indications:
 Prevention of stroke and systemic embolism in adult patients with non-valvular atrial fibrillation (AF) with one or more risk factors  Treatment of deep vein thrombosis (DVT).
It was clarified in the interviews that every NHS Board that stated it planned to spend more on anticoagulants in 2012/13 was doing so because of these additional indications.
Given that the decision to invest in rivaroxaban was made centrally (relying on the SMC's assessment of the evidence), we report the cost per QALY evidence from the SMC appraisal. The results presented are the manufacturer's base-case estimates which were not disputed by the SMC (SMC, 2012a; SMC, 2012b) .
Tocilizumab (biologic therapies)
In its response to the budget scrutiny, one NHS Board mentioned "biologic therapies" as an area of investment in 2012/13. In the follow-up telephone interview, the Finance Director explained that this was mostly for rheumatic conditions and involved recently approved drugs.
In August 2012, the SMC accepted the biologic agent tocilizumab (in combination with methotrexate) for use in patients with rheumatoid arthritis who have either responded inadequately to, or who were intolerant to, previous therapy with one or more diseasemodifying antirheumatic drugs (DMARDs) or tumour necrosis factor (TNF) antagonists.
We use SMC estimates for the cost-effectiveness of tocilizumab. The cost per QALY estimates presented in Table 6 are those submitted by the manufacturer and include the effect of a Patient Access Scheme. These ICERs were reasonably robust to various changes to the model and were accepted by the SMC (SMC, 2012c). For example, did you invest in a new piece of screening equipment or expand the provision of a particular type of surgery? As you know, we are aiming to identify specific services for which we can find cost per QALY evidence, so the more detail you can provide, the better. (ii) What were the factors that led to these services being prioritised over other services you could have set up or expanded? (iii) Did the cost-effectiveness of the services influence your decision? (iv) IF INTERVIEWEE DOES NOT REFER TO COST/QALY: Did the costeffectiveness of the services in terms of the cost per QALY influence your decision? (v) Could you point me to any particular evidence (published or unpublished) which helped you to make the decision?
(b) We would like to find out some more details about the new rheumatology consultant:
(i) Were they hired to address any particular rheumatologic condition, or to provide services across the board? (ii) What were the factors that led to this particular service being prioritised over other services you could have set up or expanded? (iii) Did the cost-effectiveness of this service influence your decision? (iv) IF INTERVIEWEE DOES NOT REFER TO COST/QALY: Did the costeffectiveness of this service in terms of the cost per QALY influence your decision? (v) Could you point me to any particular evidence (published or unpublished) which helped you to make the decision to fund this service?
(c) We would like to find out some more details about the investment in insulin pumps:
(i) As I understand it, all NHS Boards in Scotland have HEAT targets to meet regarding the provision of insulin pumps -is it the response to this Scottish Government initiative that you're referring to? (ii) What were the factors that led to this particular service being prioritised over other services you could have set up or expanded? (iii) Did the cost-effectiveness of this service influence your decision? (iv) IF INTERVIEWEE DOES NOT REFER TO COST/QALY: Did the costeffectiveness of this service in terms of the cost per QALY influence your decision? (v) Could you point me to any particular evidence (published or unpublished) which helped you to make the decision to fund this service? (b) Please identify the three main areas in which these savings will be made and the contribution that these areas will make to overall savings in 2012-13" To part (b), you answered:
1. Prescribing including drugs coming off patent 2. Rationalisation of support services 3. Clinical productivity though Lean, Best Value reviews, etc.
(a) (i) Just to check: I am assuming that the savings named here were planned to be made through efficiency improvements rather than disinvesting in healthimproving services -is this right?
(ii) Were there any other planned disinvestments for 2012-13? As you know, our aim is to identify specific services for which we can look for cost per QALY evidence.
With that in mind, we are particularly interested in instances where you might have stopped or deliberately decreased funding, or tightened the referral criteria, for particular services/technologies/medicines/procedures? (iii) (i) Does the allocation to any specific part of the Change Fund for older people's services represent a significant increase or decrease from the amount spent on it in the previous year? (ii) IF YES: As you know, our aim is to identify services for which we can look for cost per QALY evidence. With that in mind, could you give some more details of where the extra money would be spent? (iii) Does the allocation to any specific part of the Early Years Change Fund represent a significant increase or decrease from the amount spent on it in the previous year? (iv) IF YES: As you know, our aim is to identify services for which we can look for cost per QALY evidence. With that in mind, could you give some more details of where the extra money would be spent?
Question 6(a) of the budget scrutiny asked:
"What specific preventative health programmes are included in your budget plans for 2012-13? (please give details of planned expenditure)"
You answered:
